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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, individuals have the legal right to choose their 
friends, spouses, and many other sorts of associates on whatever grounds 
they like.  No law forbids them from discriminating in these choices on 
the basis of race, gender, religion, sexual preference, or any other 
traditionally “suspect” category.  Moreover, most people seem to believe 
that individuals ought to have the legal right to discriminate in these 
ways.1  Morally, we might find a person who chooses friends or spouses 
only from among a certain race to be anything from shallow to 
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 1. This is the case, I believe, even when we view the discrimination as morally 
wrongful.  Thus, throughout this essay, I will use the term discrimination to refer 
specifically to morally wrongful discrimination. 




repugnant.  But this moral condemnation of her conduct does not affect 
our judgment that she ought to have a legal right to engage in it.  Thus, 
even while we make a moral judgment condemning her conduct, we 
make another moral judgment that legal institutions ought not punish it. 
Things are different in the world of commerce.  Many employers are 
forbidden from discriminating in their hiring practices on the basis of 
race, sex, color, religion, and national origin.2  For current employees, 
promotion and pay decisions are also subject to federal antidiscrimination 
regulations.  And many of the ways in which businesses are forbidden 
from discriminating against employees or potential employees also 
extend to their treatment of other groups.  For instance, the Federal Civil 
Rights Acts3 prohibit racial discrimination in independent contractor 
relationships and bar businesses that are deemed public accommodations 
from discriminating against customers on various grounds.  Not only are 
federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination within businesses 
ubiquitous, but they are also generally the subject of moral approval.  
Most people make the moral judgment that laws ought to exist barring 
businesses from discriminating in these sorts of ways. 
In this Article I examine the disparity between attitudes toward 
regulating private discrimination and those concerning the regulation of 
what I will call “commercial” discrimination.  My hope is to find a 
theory that can simultaneously explain these divergent attitudes by 
providing an account that fits the various aspects of our legal practices 
and our attitudes toward them, and justify those practices by providing 
an account that makes the divergence attractive from a moral point of 
view.4  I focus on an explanation of the disparity that is grounded in 
three different sorts of considerations: differences in our epistemological 
access to private and commercial discrimination, different effects these 
forms of discrimination have on their victims, and differences in the 
relative importance of the value of autonomy at stake.  I conclude that 
while considerations of autonomy provide the best explanation for the 
disparity in attitudes toward the legal treatment of discrimination, they 
still fall well short of an explanation that completely fits and justifies our 
current practice.  The account I defend is thus revisionist in that it will 
 2. For an overview of employment discrimination law in the United States, see 
THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 3-11 (2001).  
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 4. Throughout this paper, I will generally use the terms explain and explanation 
in a broad sense, referring to an account or the provision of an account that both fits and 
justifies a practice in the senses described above, reserving use of the terms justify and 
justification for those instances where I want to place special emphasis on the moral 
evaluation of a practice or attitude.  The task of this project, then, is to look for an 
explanation that plays the role of an interpretation, in Dworkin’s sense.  See RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986). 
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suggest that for our practice toward discrimination to be a coherent 
whole, it must be modified in significant ways.  Specifically, I suggest 
that the disparity between our current legal treatment of private versus 
commercial discrimination is based on what I believe to be a mistaken 
belief about the greater importance of autonomy in the private realm 
than in the commercial sphere.  Because this belief is mistaken, a practice 
designed to consistently respect the value of autonomy ought to 
differentiate less between private and commercial discrimination, either 
by regulating the former more heavily, or by regulating the latter less 
heavily. 
II.  EPISTEMOLOGY 
One possible reason for regulating commercial and private discrimination 
differently is that the former might be easier and less costly to detect 
than the latter.  This approach leaves open the possibility that both forms 
of discrimination are equally wrong from a moral point of view.  The 
decision not to prosecute individuals for private discrimination is made not 
on the grounds that such discrimination is not wrongful, but rather on the 
grounds that the epistemic hurdles to discovering such discrimination 
make it a poor target for legal regulation. 
There are several things to be said in favor of this argument.  First, 
any kind of discrimination, whether private or commercial, has the 
potential to manifest in a great variety of forms, and this can make its 
detection difficult.  One individual might choose friends of only a certain 
race, while another might have friends of all races but treat those friends 
in subtly different ways depending on the race to which they belong.  
Some individuals will discriminate consciously, perhaps even proudly, 
while others might be surprised to learn that they are discriminating at 
all.  The fact that discrimination can take so many shapes makes it 
difficult to know what to look for, and this means that the epistemic 
hurdle is already set fairly high for all types of discrimination. 
But private discrimination does set additional epistemic barriers to 
regulation, for it often manifests in the most intimate choices of an 
individual, choices about which the individual alone may have 
information, and which she is not typically called upon to justify to 
others in any sort of written or documented form.  The reasons for an 
individual’s choice of romantic partners, for instance, are often and at 
best known only to that individual.  She is not called upon to provide 
any publicly accessible record of her choice; indeed, she might not 




discuss the reasons behind her choice with anyone at all, her romantic 
partner included. 
This private context stands in stark contrast to the way certain 
economic decisions are made in large corporations, especially hiring and 
promotion decisions.  In these decisions, two factors tend to make the 
detection of discrimination easier.  First, more people tend to be involved in 
commercial decisionmaking.  The bureaucratic structure of corporations 
generally entails that more than one person will be involved with, or at 
least have knowledge of, decisions that significantly affect the interest of 
the corporation.  The more people that have knowledge of discriminatory 
decisions, the more sources of information investigators will have.  
Second, corporate decisions often leave a “paper trail” at which investigators 
can look to determine whether discrimination occurred.  Hiring decisions, 
for instance, involve at a minimum the resumes and other documents 
submitted with each candidate’s application.  They might also involve 
emails between key decisionmakers, records of meetings held to discuss 
the candidates, and similar sorts of documents.  Of course, discriminatory 
corporate decisionmakers are unlikely to document the fact that they 
rejected a candidate’s application on wrongfully discriminatory grounds.  
Nevertheless, even if the documents do not provide any explicit statements 
of discriminatory intent, they can support a prosecution by providing 
evidence of the candidates’ objective qualifications for the job, records of 
features considered (and not considered) by the decisionmaker, and so 
forth.  This sort of hard evidence makes prosecution of discrimination in 
the corporate context much easier than it would be in a case involving 
private discrimination. 
The difference in the law’s stance toward discrimination in large 
versus small places of employment provides a final point in support of 
the claim that epistemic considerations are what distinguish the legal 
treatment of private discrimination from the treatment of commercial 
discrimination.  While federal law prohibits discrimination by large 
employers, it does not prohibit such discrimination by small employers.5  
The kinds of epistemic considerations I have been discussing provide a 
plausible justification for this disparity.  Hiring decisions made by small 
employers are more likely to involve a single person than those made by 
larger employers.  Furthermore, the bureaucratic requirements of 
documenting and justifying decisions are likely to be less of a factor for 
small employers.  If a single person is in charge of hiring decisions and 
is not required to maintain any documentation of the reasons behind her 
decisions, investigators are likely to have a difficult time establishing 
that wrongful discrimination has taken place in all but the most blatant 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
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cases.  On this argument, then, small employers are thus legally free to 
discriminate for the same reason that private individuals are—because it 
would be too difficult to gain the information necessary to prove their 
discrimination in a court of law. 
However, for all there is to be said in favor of epistemic considerations as 
one factor distinguishing the legal regulation of commercial and private 
discrimination, I do not think we can conclude that they are the sole 
factor for at least four reasons. 
First, epistemic considerations cannot be the only reason for the 
absence of legal regulation of private discrimination because the same 
epistemic considerations pervade other areas of private life which are 
subject to legal regulation.  The most obvious instances in recent history 
are the prohibitions imposed by many states against sodomy, even when 
it occurs within the privacy of the actor’s own home.6  The fact that it is 
extremely difficult for the state to gather information about the 
occurrence of sodomitic acts was no obstacle to their ban, and arguments 
about such considerations appear to have played little or no role in the 
repeal of such statues when they have been repealed.7  Further examples 
of laws prohibiting difficult-to-detect behavior can be multiplied indefinitely: 
drug use, various forms of tax evasion, polygamy, and so on.8  For better 
or for worse, the law’s ignorance seems to be no deterrent to its taking 
action. 
Second, while it is certainly true that it is difficult to gather information 
about some forms of private discrimination, there are many instances of 
private discrimination about which information is readily available.  
Some individuals are outspoken about their racial, religious, or other 
biases.  Some even go so far as to document their biases in writing.  Epistemic 
considerations would present little barrier to the legal regulation of at 
least these more overt forms of discrimination. 
The third reason epistemic considerations cannot be the sole grounds 
for differentiating between commercial and private discrimination is 
 6. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986). 
 7. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), for instance, is based almost entirely 
on the liberty interest of individuals to control their intimate lives, and makes no mention 
of the sort of epistemological considerations discussed here. 
 8. Laws regulating or prohibiting difficult-to-detect consumption or trade of 
certain opiates and narcotics, for instance, exist at the state, federal, and international 
levels.  See, for example, the Harrison Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, or the 1988 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-4 (1989), 1582 U.N.T.S. 164. 




simply the flip side of the second.  Not only is private discrimination 
sometimes easy to detect, but commercial discrimination is often difficult to 
detect.  Proving discriminatory intent, or even adverse effect, can be difficult, 
especially in an era where managers have been exhaustively socialized 
to be sensitive to the wrongness of discrimination and are likely to take 
great pains to cover their tracks should they engage in discriminatory 
behavior.9
Finally, the idea that disparate legal stances toward private and 
commercial discrimination are based on epistemic considerations alone 
depends on an incorrect assumption about the purpose of law.  Lack of 
epistemic access to a type of behavior might be a definitive reason to not 
legally regulate that behavior if considerations of effective enforcement 
were central to the justification of legal regulation.  But while such 
considerations might be important, they are not central.  Legal regulations 
can serve an important role, even if they are very difficult to enforce, by 
sending a message to the public that they ought not engage in a certain 
behavior.10  For most individuals most of the time, receipt of this 
message will be enough to give them a reason not to engage in the 
prohibited behavior, regardless of the likelihood that their disobedience 
would be successfully detected and prosecuted.  It is therefore arguable 
that this expressive, or communicative, aspect of law is even more 
central to our understanding of law’s function than the enforcement 
aspect.  Thus, the fact that private discrimination is not legally regulated 
cannot be adequately explained by epistemic difficulties, for by regulating 
private discrimination, the law could effectively send a message of 
disapproval regarding such behavior, regardless of whether its regulations 
could be effectively enforced.  That it chooses not to do so must be 
explained by other considerations. 
III.  EFFECTS ON THE VICTIM 
If the disparity between the legal regulation of commercial discrimination 
and the complete lack of regulation of private discrimination cannot be 
explained by epistemic considerations, perhaps it can be explained by 
differences in the way these types of discrimination affect their victims.  
In other words, perhaps the reason that commercial discrimination is 
regulated while private discrimination is not is that the former causes 
more serious harm to its victims than the latter. 
 9. See HAGGARD, supra note 2, at 59-107,  for a discussion of these difficulties. 
 10. See, for example, H.L.A. Hart’s discussion of the way in which enforcement of 
the criminal law via prosecution is indicative of a failure of the law to perform its 
primary purpose of guiding and controlling life outside of the courtroom.  H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 38-42 (2d ed. 1994). 
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Commercial discrimination causes two distinct sorts of harm.  The 
most obvious harm, and the most obvious ground on which to 
distinguish commercial from private discrimination, is a lack of access 
to a certain kind of good—in this case, the full range of goods provided 
by commercial exchange.  Let us call these benefit harms.  Someone who is 
denied a job because of a discriminatory hiring decision, for instance, 
loses out on the wages she would have earned at that job, the knowledge 
she might have acquired from the work, and the pleasure of engaging in 
meaningful work of that particular sort.  A firm that is denied a contracting 
position because of a discriminatory decision is denied the monetary 
benefits of that position, the opportunity to possibly expand the business, 
and so on.  Customers who are discriminated against by businesses lose 
the opportunity to buy the products they desire. 
The second sort of harm inflicted by commercial discrimination has 
less to do with the lost benefits of commercial exchanges than with the 
message communicated by the act of discrimination itself.  Discrimination, 
according to many arguments, is a way of failing to respect an 
individual—what we can call a respect harm.  What precisely is meant 
by this claim will vary with the argument under consideration.  What 
such arguments tend to have in common, however, is that they consider 
the wrongness of discrimination to be a matter of treating the victim as 
being unworthy in some respect.11  For instance, some arguments claim 
that discrimination signals that the actor views the victim as being of a 
lower moral status—of being less worthy of consideration and care than 
the agent herself or than other members of society.12
However, respect harm only occurs when discrimination is based on 
what Larry Alexander has called a “bias,” and not all forms of wrongful 
discrimination involve biases.13  Some forms of wrongful discrimination 
are based instead on prejudices.  And prejudices do not necessarily 
involve viewing the victim as bearing a lower moral status.  Instead, 
prejudice involves judging an individual to possess a certain characteristic 
based solely on his possession of some other characteristic such as 
 11. For an example of such an argument, see Paul Woodruff, What’s Wrong with 
Discrimination?, 36 ANALYSIS 158, 158-60 (1976). 
 12. Michael Blake, in this volume, claims that some sorts of discrimination can 
send a message of “social inferiority and internalized shame.”  Michael Blake, The 
Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017, 1030 (2006).  
 13. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158-63 (1992).  




membership in a certain racial group.14  Discrimination based on prejudice 
can still be disrespectful to the victim because it can still convey to her 
that she is unworthy, but the sense of unworthiness involved with 
prejudice is more limited.  Discrimination based on bias proclaims the 
victim to be worthy of less moral concern and care because of her group 
membership.  In contrast, discrimination based on prejudice proclaims 
the victim to be unworthy of the job because of her supposed possession 
of some undesirable characteristic, or lack of possession of some 
desirable characteristic, for which her membership in the group is evidence. 
The case could be made that commercial discrimination creates more 
serious benefit harms than private discrimination.  People need jobs to 
survive.  Travelers need to be able to find hotels that will rent them a 
room.  Being denied an education can set back not only the individual 
who is denied, but that individual’s family as well.  Considering that 
individuals who lose these needed goods due to discrimination suffer in 
serious ways, it is easy to assume that the costs of personal discrimination 
are less severe.  However, there are three reasons why this is not clearly 
so. 
First, the benefit harms caused by commercial discrimination might 
not always be as high as I have suggested.  The purported harmfulness of 
commercial discrimination is generally based on the value of the good 
that is denied.  Jobs, lodging, and access to education are undoubtedly 
important.  But the effect of commercial discrimination on a victim depends 
not just upon the value of the denied good, it depends also upon the 
available options for obtaining that good elsewhere.  A thirsty man’s 
interest in getting a drink of water is not seriously set back by a broken 
drinking fountain if a working one is just a block away.  Likewise, even 
if the value of a job lost due to discrimination is high, the magnitude of 
the benefit harm suffered by the victim will be small if another equally 
good job is available to her.  Thus, the degree of benefit harm caused by 
commercial discrimination depends on how widespread that discrimination 
is, whether most other businesses discriminate on the same grounds, 
whether the discrimination takes place in all contexts or only in certain 
ones, and so forth.15  As discrimination becomes rarer, the benefit harm 
of any token of discrimination becomes less severe. 
 14. See id. at 167-74 (referring to prejudicial discrimination as “discrimination 
based on proxy traits”). 
 15. This point is widely acknowledged in the literature surrounding the wrongness 
of discrimination.  See, e.g., id. (“If [discriminatory preferences] are idiosyncratic and 
variable, uncommon, or context-specific—‘I’m uncomfortable around Italians in my 
private club but not at work’—rather than categorical—‘I prefer to avoid Jews in all 
contexts’—and do not disprefer the already relatively disadvantaged, their adverse social 
effects may be relatively minimal.”).  Similarly, Kimberly Yuracko notes that “[i]rrational but 
idiosyncratic discrimination is less harmful—both to individuals and socially salient 
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It is plausible, then, to suppose that the benefit harms imposed by 
some forms of commercial discrimination are fairly low.  For example, 
if a small employer in a major metropolitan area like Atlanta decides to 
discriminate against white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants in his hiring, the 
benefit harm will be almost nil, even if the quality of the jobs he is 
offering is terrific.  As beneficial as the jobs might be, the victims are 
likely to have numerous other options.  Atlanta has many equally terrific 
jobs, and most employers likely do not discriminate against white, 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants. 
Second, even if the benefit harms imposed by commercial discrimination 
are more severe than those imposed by private discrimination, it is still 
possible that private discrimination imposes greater respect harms.  
There is pressure in a market economy for businesses to base important 
personnel decisions on factors directly relevant to the maximization of 
profit, and to base their decisions on only such factors.  This could lead 
to employment discrimination against members of certain groups if 
managers are prejudiced against those groups—if they believe that 
members of those groups possess certain other characteristics that are 
relevant to their ability to contribute to the firm’s profit.  This pressure 
could also cause discrimination due to “reaction qualifications” if 
managers are concerned about the way in which their discriminating 
customers or stockholders will react to their employment of members of 
the group in question.16  But the effect of outright biases—simple dislike 
for members of another group—is likely to be checked by the pressure 
of a competitive market to base decisions exclusively on considerations 
of profit. 
Victims of discrimination in the commercial sphere are thus, ceteris 
paribus, more likely to be victims of prejudice than of bias.  And it 
seems plausible to suppose that to the extent this is true, victims of 
commercial discrimination will suffer less in the way of respect harms 
because discrimination based on prejudice does not amount to a lack of 
respect for the victim as such, in the way that discrimination based on 
bias does.  Job candidates who are rejected because of prejudice are not 
groups—than irrational and systemic discrimination.”  Kimberly Yuracko, Sameness, 
Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a More Complete Theory of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (2006); see also Mark Kelman, Defining 
the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2006) (describing 
the context-sensitive nature of the injuries caused by discrimination). 
 16. See Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99, 
99-101 (1983).  




rejected because their potential employer views them as less worthy of 
respect or inherently morally inferior.  They are rejected because their 
employer believes, perhaps falsely, perhaps correctly, that their membership 
in a certain group is evidence of their possession of some other profit-
affecting trait.  The rejection is not of the candidate as a person, but of 
the candidate as the supposed possessor of some undesirable trait.17  
Indeed, it will often be a trait that the victim herself would find undesirable.  
In these cases, the candidate can possibly find some detachment from the 
discrimination, and perhaps even partially and imperfectly sympathize 
with it.  Even while offended at being seen as undesirable for the job, it 
would still be possible for the victim to think, “If I were deciding who to 
hire and believed that I had evidence that a candidate was lazy, 
potentially violent, and so on, I would not hire them either.” 
Thus, even while the benefit harms of commercial discrimination 
might be greater than those imposed by private discrimination, the latter 
might impose greater respect harms than the former.  And such harms 
can be significant.  The feeling of social isolation that results from 
private discrimination can be psychologically devastating.  This is especially 
true for children, who are particularly prone to question their own self-
worth in reaction to discrimination from their peers, but the effects hold 
for adults as well.  Private discrimination can have a tremendous impact 
on the psychological well-being of even the most self-assured adults. 
As is the case with commercial discrimination, the magnitude of the 
harm caused by private discrimination will depend on the extent to 
which the discrimination is widely practiced, in a variety of contexts, 
and so forth.  But the nature of the dependency will often differ.  In 
commercial discrimination, the primary form of harm resulting from 
discrimination is benefit harm—commercial discrimination prevents 
individuals from realizing the various goods of commercial exchange.  
 17. One could, I suppose, push on this argument by claiming that racial biases do 
not amount to a rejection of the person qua person either, but simply a rejection of the 
person as possessor of a certain racial/gender/religious trait.  Does it follow that victims 
of biases are thus not disrespected?  I think not.  The traits which the discriminating 
manager is trying to avoid in cases of prejudice are very often those about which there 
exists a good deal of consensus regarding their “badness,” such that it is likely that even 
the victim of prejudicial discrimination will herself view those characteristics as bad and 
alien to herself.  The traits targeted by biases, however, are generally not viewed as bad 
by the people who hold those traits, and are indeed often held to be a valuable part of 
their personal identity.  Thus, if you refuse to associate with me because you believe that 
I am violent, I will probably at least partially sympathize with your motives, since I share 
a desire to disassociate myself from violent people.  But if you refuse to associate with 
me because I am black, I will be offended because I do not view my blackness as a trait 
that merits such a response; rather, I view my blackness as part of who I am, and I 
therefore regard your rejection of my blackness as partly a rejection of me, and of a part 
of me which I value. 
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Benefit harms can be minimized if there are a variety of alternative 
sources available from which the victim can secure the benefit in 
question.  But it is not so clear that the respect harms caused by private 
discrimination function in the same way.  A child who is socially 
excluded by a discriminatory group of peers at school does not negate 
this harm entirely by finding another group of individuals that will 
accept her.  She might negate the benefit harm of the first group’s 
discrimination—they denied her the good of friendship, but she was able 
to realize that good elsewhere—but the disrespect they have done to her 
remains.  The harmful stigmatization, or respect harm, that results from 
discrimination is not merely a matter of being denied access to some 
good, it is a positive evil that cannot simply be erased by the addition of 
other goods.  The fact that respect harms cannot be “balanced out” by 
the addition of other goods is one way in which such harms are even 
worse than the benefit harms characteristic of commercial discrimination. 
Finally, it is not at all clear that the benefit harms of commercial 
discrimination are indeed greater than those of private discrimination.  
Glenn Loury, for instance, argues that private “discrimination in contact” 
can be even more damaging to minorities’ long-term socioeconomic 
status than the formal “discrimination in contract” that takes place in the 
commercial sphere.18  The most compelling reason for thinking that he is 
right is found in the phenomenon of assortative marriage.  Alan Wertheimer, 
in his contribution to this volume, makes a compelling case that 
assortative marriage—the tendency of individuals to marry individuals who 
are like them in certain relevant respects—can, in conjunction with 
private discrimination of various kinds, yield socioeconomic consequences 
that significantly affect numerous groups and individuals for generations.19  
This is especially so in a country like the United States, with a long 
history of racial discrimination against certain minority groups and a 
relatively high degree of socioeconomic inequality among the relevant 
ethnic groups. 
Blacks, for instance, have a much lower socioeconomic status on 
average than whites.  If, as Wertheimer notes, “blacks and whites 
married each other without respect to race, in which case most whites 
would marry whites and most blacks would also marry whites, racial 
inequality as such would vanish within a generation, although class 
 18. See GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 95-96 (2002).  
 19. See Alan Wertheimer, Reflections on Discrimination, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
945, 954 (2006).  




inequality would remain.”20  However, blacks and whites do not marry 
each other without respect to race; racial intermarriage between blacks 
and whites is, in fact, still relatively rare.21  The cause of this need not be 
racial discrimination as such.  Persons tend to mate with individuals who 
share similar cultural backgrounds, educational levels, economic status, 
and so forth.22  Given that these traits are unequally divided among racial 
groups, racially assortative mating is likely to occur even without the 
contribution of racial discrimination.  Still, discrimination undoubtedly 
plays a role, and to the extent that patterns of assortative mating are the 
result of that discrimination, it is fair to blame private discrimination for 
at least a part in perpetuating inequality between the races, and all the 
ills associated with it.  These are very serious harms indeed. 
I do not think it is plausible, then, to suppose that the difference 
between the legal regulation of private versus commercial discrimination 
can be adequately explained by the allegedly greater harm imposed by 
the latter.  For I do not think it is true that the harms of commercial 
discrimination are necessarily, or even typically, greater than the harms 
of private discrimination. 
IV.  AUTONOMY 
The last, and I believe most plausible, explanation of the difference 
between the legal treatment of private versus commercial discrimination 
is based on the idea of a sphere of personal autonomy.  On this theory, it 
is wrong to regulate private discrimination because the kind of activity it 
involves falls within an area in which individuals should be free to act as 
they choose, even if their actions are morally wrong.  Commercial 
discrimination, however, and commercial activity in general, falls outside 
of this protected sphere.  Therefore, even if both forms of discrimination 
are equally wrongful, commercial discrimination is properly subject to 
legal regulation and private discrimination is not. 
Conceptions of autonomy vary greatly in their details.23  All that is 
needed for the current position, however, is a basic understanding with 
 20. Id. at 957. 
 21. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census Data on Interracial Marriage, http://www. 
census.gov/population/socdemo/race/interractab1.txt (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) (demonstrating 
that in 1992, interracial marriages in the United States counted for only 2.2% of all 
marriages). 
 22. For a classic economic explanation of why assortative mating occurs, see Gary 
Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part 1, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813, 813-46 (1973). 
 23. See John Christman’s entry on the topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy for a useful overview of the competing conceptions and their relative 
merits.  John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILO. 2-3 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2003 ed.), available at 
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which we can say that even when A’s discriminatory actions are morally 
wrong, it would also be morally wrong for the state to prohibit A from 
performing those actions. 
The most plausible argument for an understanding of autonomy that 
protects private discriminatory actions is one based on the individual’s 
interest in being free from state regulation of private activity.  Such an 
argument would begin by noting the nature and importance of the 
interest that individuals have in being free to live their lives without 
interference.  This sort of argument is commonplace in liberal theorizing, 
and probably found its most persuasive expression in John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty.24  According to Mill, each individual has an interest in defining 
the contours of her own life.25  This interest of course encompasses 
making one’s own decisions on the “big issues” of life, such as whether 
and whom to marry, what sort of career to pursue, and whether and what 
kind of religious belief and practice to adopt, but it also extends to 
smaller matters.  The seemingly insignificant aspects of everyday life 
are, after all, the stuff of which the grand themes of a life are composed.  
Decisions which seem small in themselves—decisions about what sorts 
of clothes to wear, what to do in one’s spare time, what style of speech 
to use with others—can, in the aggregate, help define one’s self-image 
and the image one presents to others.  These are matters of tremendous 
personal significance.26
The question, then, is whether this interest in individual self-definition 
entails an interest in the freedom to engage in morally wrongful private 
discrimination.  This question cannot be settled merely by looking at the 
ways in which people do define themselves as a matter of contingent 
fact.  It is no doubt true as an empirical claim that many individuals 
define themselves partly in virtue of their wrongfully discriminatory 
attitudes and behaviors.  Klan members and neo-Nazis, to name just two 
of the most obvious and extreme examples, often derive a large part of 
their self-identity from their discrimination against others.  The question, 
however, is not whether they can do so but whether they have an interest 
in doing so free from state regulation.  This question is a moral one, not 
a sociological one. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/autonomy-moral (last visited Dec. 20, 
2006). 
 24. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1877).  
 25. Id. at 100-32. 
 26. Id. 




I believe that a fairly convincing case can be made for an affirmative 
answer to this question along Millian lines.  The argument, like Mill’s, is 
based on skepticism regarding the ability of government regulators to 
acquire or use the knowledge necessary to effectively regulate wrongful 
private discrimination.27  This skepticism comes in two forms.  The first 
is a skepticism regarding the ability of potential regulators to correctly 
identify that subcategory of discrimination that is genuinely morally 
wrongful.  Not all discrimination, of course, is morally wrongful.  
Discriminating between productive and unproductive employees, for 
example, or between loyal and disloyal friends, is almost certainly 
morally admirable, not wrongful.  What is it, then, that distinguishes 
morally wrongful discrimination from morally benign or praiseworthy 
discrimination?  Unfortunately, no clear answer to this question appears 
to exist.  What is certain is that there is no one thing that divides all 
cases of morally permissible discrimination from morally impermissible 
ones.28  Beyond that, there is little theoretical agreement regarding which 
features of discrimination are wrong-making, and how wrong-making 
they are.29  Some believe that the consequences of wrongful discrimination 
are what make such discrimination wrong, though there is disagreement 
regarding what those wrong-making consequences are.30  Others believe 
that the wrongfulness of discrimination is a matter of the wrongfulness 
of the attitude or intention on which it is based.31  Still others are doubtful 
that many of the paradigm cases of discrimination are even wrong at 
all.32
All this disagreement about what constitutes wrongful discrimination 
exists at the level of theory, but things get even murkier when we move 
to the level of practice.  Even if we could agree, for instance, that 
discrimination is wrongful when it negatively affects the most vulnerable 
members of society, it would still be difficult to figure out when this 
condition is met.  And it would often be equally difficult to discern the 
 27. See id. at ch. 2 (arguing that government regulators cannot safely censor false 
opinions while protecting true ones because they do not know which opinions are true 
and which are false).  The argument I consider in this section is similarly based on 
doubts about the knowledge of government regulators, but extends the subject of their 
ignorance in various ways. 
 28. See Alexander, supra note 13. 
 29. The diverse array of positions advocated in this volume, fourteen years after 
Alexander’s initial stab at the question, are evidence enough of this. 
 30. See, e.g., Richard Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 775, 790 (2006); Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Private Discrimination: A 
Prioritarian, Desert-Accommodating Account, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 817 (2006). 
 31. See Alexander, supra note 13, at 192, saying this is at least part of a correct 
account of wrongful discrimination. 
 32. For a qualified version of this argument, see Peter Vallentyne, Left 
Libertarianism and Private Discrimination, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 981, 984 (2006).   
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intention of a discriminator with the degree of precision and certainty 
required for effective regulation.  This is especially true when it comes 
to the paradigm cases of private discrimination that we think the law 
ought not to regulate.  How might the would-be regulator know whether 
X’s choice of mate, religion, or political associates is motivated by 
impermissible animosity or by legitimate, if eccentric, personal tastes?  
What sort of investigative powers would be required to find out?  And 
how well can judges and juries make such fine-grained judgments about 
the morality or immorality of these intimate choices? 
There is a second sort of Millian skepticism relevant to the present 
inquiry.  Not only is it unlikely that regulators and enforcers can effectively 
distinguish between wrongful and non-wrongful discrimination, it is also 
unlikely that they can arrive at universally correct judgments about the 
significance of the freedom to engage in discrimination, wrongful or not, 
in an individual’s life.  It is possible that discriminatory attitudes and 
behaviors, while morally wrong in certain respects, nevertheless also 
serve some morally praiseworthy goals for the individuals who hold or 
practice them.  By allowing different individuals to hold and practice 
discriminatory attitudes and behaviors to different extents, we allow 
them as individuals and society as a whole to learn whether particular 
kinds of discrimination are constructive.  The mere moral wrongfulness 
of an activity does not make it insignificant for an individual’s project of 
self-definition.33  And if a discriminatory activity is significant, we 
might wish to allow individuals the freedom to engage in it, despite its 
wrongness. 
Those who defend an autonomy-based right to engage in private 
discrimination, then, can argue that even when such discrimination is not 
right, from a moral perspective, it need not necessarily violate anyone’s 
 33. The Boy Scouts of America, for instance, discriminate against homosexuals 
and atheists in their membership criteria.  But this discrimination, the ability to exclude, 
is part and parcel of the ability to define what they are, as an organization.  From the 
perspective of the group, this freedom to self-define is part of what makes membership 
meaningful to its individual members.  And from the perspective of a society in which a 
plurality of such groups exist, defining themselves along a variety of different lines, this 
freedom is what makes a flourishing civil society possible.  On the relationship between 
freedom of association, discrimination, and civil society, see NANCY ROSENBLUM, 
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1998).  For 
a detailed case study of the ways in which groups which are morally objectionable in 
some respects can nevertheless provide valuable social goods, see DAVID BEITO, FROM 
MUTUAL AID TO WELFARE STATE (2000). 




moral rights.34  It is proper for the state to use its coercive force to 
protect people’s moral rights, the argument could continue, but not to 
prevent individuals from acting in a morally wrongful way.35  Indeed, so 
long as they are not violating anyone’s moral rights, we could conclude, 
individuals themselves have a moral right to be free from coercive 
interference, so that state regulation of non-rights-violating private 
discrimination would itself be rights-violating, and thus impermissible. 
Still, even if the above argument provides a convincing account of 
why we ought not regulate private discrimination, this is still only half of 
what is necessary to draw a distinction between the proper legal treatment 
of private and commercial discrimination.  If, for instance, we believe 
that wrongful private discrimination cannot properly be regulated 
because it is not rights-violating, why should we not also say that 
commercial discrimination, while wrong, is equally non-rights-violating?  
Most arguments that commercial discrimination is rights-violating, I 
suppose, will rely upon claims either about the more serious harms 
caused by commercial discrimination, or about the lesser interest commercial 
agents have in the freedom to engage in wrongful discrimination.  Part 
III of this Article considered and rejected the first consideration.  A 
response to the second consideration leads to an evaluation of an 
argument previously examined in this section—that individuals have an 
interest in being free to engage in wrongful discrimination—and leads us 
to ask whether this interest is held by commercial actors as well. 
The belief that commercial agents do not have such an interest is, I 
think, based largely on the belief that the only interest commercial agents 
have, qua commercial agents, is profit.  This assumption is frequently 
reflected in the literature on defining “job-relevant characteristics,” 
where the claim is often made that a characteristic is job-relevant if and 
only if it affects the employer’s profits.36  On this assumption, commercial 
agents do not have an interest in wrongful discrimination except in those 
cases where engaging in wrongful discrimination can help to maximize 
profit, and in these cases their interest is simply insufficient to justify the 
discriminatory acts. 
The argument that commercial agents have no interest in wrongful 
discrimination, or a nominal interest at most, is reliant upon a sharp 
distinction between individuals in their private capacity and individuals 
in their capacity as economic agents.  In their private capacity, individuals 
might have any of a variety of goals, aspirations, and projects, and 
 34. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).  
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., D.W. Haslett, Workplace Discrimination, Good Cause, and Color 
Blindness, 36 J. VALUE INQUIRY 73, 76-77 (2002).  
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therefore ought to be allowed the freedom to act in ways that contribute 
to their freely chosen self-identity.  As economic agents, however, individuals 
have only one goal—the maximization of profit—and the state may 
legitimately prohibit or regulate any activity that is not required for this 
goal, if it can serve some legitimate state interest by doing so.  This 
argument has a certain plausibility to it; a large corporation governed by a 
board of directors which serves at the mercy of its stockholders might 
fairly be presumed to have the maximization of profit as its primary 
interest.  Moreover, the cases in which the argument seems least plausible 
are cases where the law makes exceptions to allow for commercial 
discrimination.  For small, family-run businesses, the primary goal might 
often be something intangible, such as the continuance of a family 
tradition or the provision of meaningful work for people about whom 
one cares deeply.  Such businesses might well have a multitude of interests 
other than profit maximization, some of which might constitute an 
interest in wrongful discrimination.  But such businesses, unlike large 
corporations, are not subject to federal antidiscrimination regulations. 
Nor are associations whose primary purpose is judged to be “expressive,” 
rather than “economic,” subject to such laws.  In her concurring opinion 
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
argued that expressive organizations, such as private clubs, might have 
the right to discriminate since discrimination might be essential to the 
expression of their identity and purpose.37  Economic organizations, on 
the other hand, do not have the liberty to discriminate, because their 
purpose is assumed to be the production of profit through the provision 
of goods and services to the general public as customers.38
Although the distinctions between various types of businesses seem to 
neatly correlate with the law’s stance toward discrimination, we must 
take care not to exaggerate the justificatory strength of this explanation.  
First, not all businesses—even large ones—have the production of profit 
as their primary goal.  The goals expressed in a company’s mission 
statement must be viewed with some skepticism, but there is no doubt 
some truth to some companies’ claims to have a core mission of 
producing excellence in a certain type of product or strengthening the 
community of which they are a part.39  It is, of course, a further question 
 37. 468 U.S. 609, 631-40 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Ben & Jerry’s, for instance, includes in its mission statement a “social 
mission,” which says that the company aims “[t]o operate the company in a way that 




whether the non-profit-related interests of a company entail an interest in 
the liberty to engage in wrongful discrimination, and it is difficult to see 
how the relatively benign interests described above would justify such 
discrimination.  But we should not be as quick as is the argument under 
consideration to assume that this is impossible. 
Furthermore, even if most businesses do have as their primary aim the 
production of profit, this is not necessarily something we should wish to 
encourage by incorporating it into our definition of an economic entity.  
Part of the problem with business activity exemplified in the wave of 
corporate scandals over the last ten years is that individuals have been 
too ready to view business as nothing more than a tool for the production 
of profit.40  Arguably, these individuals were too successful at divorcing 
their personal values from their business life, and were too ready to 
sacrifice or ignore those values in order to make a profit.41  And while it 
is certainly true that we should not encourage businesses to govern 
themselves in discriminatory ways, we should nevertheless also avoid 
encouraging them to view themselves as entities standing completely 
detached from the values and projects of the individuals who constitute 
them.  Making room for businesses in which the integration of personal 
and economic values is accomplished in a good way might mean making 
room for ones in which it is done badly. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article’s quest for an account of the difference between the legal 
treatment of private and commercial discrimination has been only partly 
successful.  Respect for the value of autonomy appears to provide a 
better explanation and justification of the disparity than either epistemological 
or consequentialist considerations.  But there are good reasons to doubt 
that even an autonomy-based account can completely vindicate the current 
legal practice.  That practice seems to presuppose that the value of 
autonomy is significantly greater in private than in commercial contexts.  
And it is not clear that this assumption is warranted. 
Since the current antidiscrimination regulatory scheme cannot be 
wholly vindicated by appeal to autonomy or any other plausible values, 
actively recognizes the central role that business plays in society by initiating innovative 
ways to improve the quality of life locally, nationally & internationally.”  Whether or not 
one thinks they are successful in this mission, the activities of the company seem to 
support that they are sincere in their intentions.  Ben & Jerry’s,  http://www.benjerrys. 
com/our_company/our_mission/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
 40. For a popular discussion of some of these recent corporate scandals and the 
moral failures behind them, see DAVID CALLAHAN, THE CHEATING CULTURE (2004). 
 41. For a detailed analysis of this divorce in the case of Enron, see BETHANY 
MCLEAN & PETER EKLIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (2004). 
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the legal practice ought to be changed.  But the arguments that I have 
provided in this Article leave room for discretion in the direction of that 
change.  That the value of autonomy is not significantly greater in private 
than in commercial contexts demonstrates that we cannot appeal to 
interests in autonomy to justify differential regulation.  But there are two 
ways in which we could make regulation nondifferential: we could 
regulate commercial discrimination less, or we could regulate private 
discrimination more. 
Whether it is more appealing to deregulate commercial discrimination 
or to begin regulating private discrimination cannot depend solely on the 
relative value of autonomy in private and commercial contexts, since, as 
I have tried to show, the interests in each context are not as disparate as 
has commonly been supposed.  Rather, the decision will depend on the 
absolute value we assign to autonomy, and the way in which this value 
compares with other values at stake in cases of discrimination.  How 
important is autonomy as a value, and how does it compare with the 
negative value of the harms caused by discrimination?  I personally assign a 
fairly high weight to considerations of autonomy, and this pushes me in 
the direction of regulating commercial discrimination less rather than 
regulating private discrimination more.  But an argument for this belief 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  My goal here has not been to suggest 
a particular way of resolving the inconsistency between the legal 
regulation of private and commercial discrimination.  My goal has simply 
been to point out that there is such an inconsistency, and that it cannot be 
completely explained and justified by appeal to any plausible set of 
values.  Our legal treatment of discrimination must change, but it remains to 
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